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Abstract: 
 
 In the field of restorative justice (rj) there is regular debate regarding the terms 
restorative and justice. In spite of efforts to come to a common vision, this ongoing 
discussion illustrates how theoretical and practical disagreements have resulted in rj 
being characterized as ambiguous and inconsistent within the judicial context and 
beyond (Gavrielides, 2008; Sullivan & Tifft, 2005; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007). 
Arising out of research conducted in an education context (Vaandering, 2009), this 
paper identifies the impact of this ambiguity on educators. More importantly, 
however, it examines the term justice and discovers that an overemphasis on justice 
as fairness and individual rights has pulled the field off-course. The paper identifies 
that what is needed is a broader understanding of justice than that given in the 
judicial context and makes the case for justice as honouring the inherent worth of all 
and enacted through relationship. If understood as such, I argue that the terms 
restorative and justice must remain paired and in place in order to serve as a much-
needed compass needle that guides proponents of rj in the field to their desired 
destinations. 
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A rusty nail placed near a faithful compass,  
will sway it from the truth, and wreck the argosy.  
Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) 
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In the field of restorative justice (rj) there is regular debate over the terms 
restorative and justice (Gavrielides, 2008; Sullivan & Tifft, 2005; Johnstone & Van Ness, 
2007). The term restorative frequently leads to questions about what exactly is being 
restored. The term justice is seen to be problematic as fields engaging with the principles 
of rj such as counseling, education, and the environment tend to replace the term with 
nouns such as restorative practice, restorative approaches, restorative schools, etc. in an 
effort to avoid any potential connotations the term evokes relating to crime and the 
judicial system. This ongoing discussion regarding theoretical and practical perspectives 
has resulted in rj being characterized as ambiguous and inconsistent within the judicial 
context and beyond (Gavrielides, 2008; Sullivan & Tifft, 2005; Johnstone & Van Ness, 
2007) in spite of efforts to come to a common vision. These tensions, however, have not 
impeded the growth of rj initiatives as is evidenced in the proliferation of organizations, 
books, articles, videos, and websites espousing the value of rj. Yet, as these initiatives 
grow, differences in perspective are significant and debates and tensions continue. Why?  
 The fact that practice continues to march ahead of theory in the global social 
movement of rj (Braithwaite, 2004; Morrison & Ahmed, 2006: Sherman and Strang, 
2007; Wheeldon, 2009) may be part of the reason. To contribute to a stronger theoretical 
foundation, in this article I argue that an overemphasis on justice as fairness and 
individual rights has pulled the field off-course and what is needed is a broader 
understanding of justice. If this more comprehensive perspective is understood amongst 
advocates of rj, I make the case that when the terms restorative and justice remain paired 
and in place they act as a compass needle guiding proponents in the field to their desired 
destinations. 
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 Gavrielides (2008) identifies that a simple theoretical discussion of definitions 
will not adequately diffuse the vicious circles created by the conceptual tensions. He 
states that what is necessary is acknowledging the multidimensional nature of the 
tensions and exploring each in depth to gradually bring about equilibrium (p. 179). In 
order to do this effectively however, I assert that an in-depth examination of the terms 
restorative and justice is far from sterile and single-layered. It is a critical, complex 
foundational step required for addressing the tensions that exist.  
 The foundation for this argument arises from a qualitative study that examined the 
impact of restorative justice on two Ontario public schools (Vaandering, 2009). A key 
finding identified inconsistency and confusion associated with rj in the educational 
context. To fully understand the dilemma in this environment I examined the limited rj 
literature rooted in schooling, and then turned to the field of law and justice for further 
clarity. By drawing on both fields, the lack of a common reference point was magnified. 
Conducting a conceptual analysis from the vantage point of education as opposed to a 
judicial context where most such discussions are currently positioned, resulted in insights 
that led to a rethinking of the term restorative justice and discovering it to be a faithful 
compass needle.  
 The article is written in four parts. Part I describes the study and how conceptual 
tensions result in uncertainty and a search for direction. It includes a brief outline of key 
theoretical discussions and a description of the debates that have caused significant fault-
lines in the field (Gavrielides, 2008). Part II develops a theoretical argument for 
maintaining the term justice by exploring what occurs when it is eliminated or when it is 
accepted. By drawing on the work of critical theorist Paulo Freire (2005), the 
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philosophical insights of Buber (1958) and Wolterstorff (2006, 2008), as well as the early 
philosophical perspectives of rj theorists Zehr (2005) and Bianchi (1994), a broader view 
of justice is presented. Part III illustrates how the term justice serves as a consistent 
reference point (North) that people can use to orient themselves from any location where 
they are engaged with the practice of rj to keep them on course. The section extends the 
theoretical perspectives of Johnstone and Van Ness (2007) as well as Morrison (2007). 
Finally, Part IV summarizes the argument indicating that reconsidering the term justice   
can provide a consistent theoretical foundation to guide the growing engagement of many 
fields with restorative justice. The article concludes by identifying how all involved in rj 
could travel together in one direction. Permeating each of the sections are three questions: 
What is justice? What is being restored? How can the term justice be employed across 
various fields without eliciting connotations of crime? 
I. Looking for direction: Conceptual tensions 
 
 A study examining rj practice situated in the field of education provides a 
different view than the prevalent judicial perspective from which the contemporary 
understanding of rj that focuses on responding to harm has arisen. Though many 
educators initially engage with rj as a means for responding to harmful behaviour, their 
primary role is not to manage behaviour but to educate. As a result in this place, 
educators engaging with rj are often set up to be pulled in different directions. Much can 
be learned from their experiences in regards to the foundational principles of rj for all 
fields. 
 The particular study this article draws on employed qualitative, critical- narrative 
case study methodology in its examination of the impact of rj on two Ontario [Canada] 
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public schools. Each school was from a different school board (district) that had recently 
committed to rj in an effort to address bullying and violence as well as reduce suspension 
and expulsion numbers. Training had been provided for approximately one-third of the 
staff in one of the schools; in the other all of the adults had received training. From both 
schools combined, 37 educators were interviewed and four teachers and two 
administrators were observed over a six-week period as they went about their daily work. 
As the researcher, by taking the position of participant-observer and using reflexivity, I 
was able to critically examine my own perspectives as well as those of the participants 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000; Harding, 1991; Pillow, 2003). Because of this role, 
the initial purpose of the study, which was to examine what rj looked like, sounded like, 
and felt like on the ground, expanded to include a analysis of theoretical frameworks as I 
began to question my own understanding of rj. Change in the researcher is not 
uncommon in qualitative studies that employ participant-observation (Denzin, 1978; 
Patton, 2003; Merriam, 1998). By acknowledging the change additional insights can 
emerge which was the case in this study and which now form the foundation for this 
article calling for rethinking the term restorative justice. This coincides with Toews and 
Zehr’s (2003) call for “finding ways of knowing and doing research that reflect the values 
we espouse in restorative justice” in order to avoid perpetuating harmful hierarchical 
power structures (p. 257).  In that spirit I designed this study and included myself in the 
research as participant-observer engaging with the participants in a communal dialogic 
manner in hopes that, like in a rj conference/circle, a fuller story or perspective of rj 
might emerge.  The theoretical insights arose as I listened to the different voices and thus 
in the context of this article are presented as my personal experience.  
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A. From this location 
 
 In analyzing the formal interviews I conducted it was obvious that educators’ 
perceptions and practices of rj were inconsistent and did not reflect the brief introduction 
to the philosophical significance of the movement they received in their training. Though 
many found that the call for a paradigm shift in terms of thinking about the role of rules 
and the need to repair harm resonated with them, in most cases they interpreted rj as a 
strategy like others they employed to better manage students. This contradicted my 
understanding of rj as a philosophy, a way of being, that I had gained from participating 
in the same trainings the participants had, my own experiences as a teacher, and from 
extended reading. I became conscious of being ‘burdened by conceptual tensions” 
(Gavrielides, 2008, p.178) as the inconsistency I was observing in others reflected my 
own struggle to find ways to articulate what rj was and why it was important. I became 
very conscious of what Sawatsky (2009) names the pluck and choose model and the 
conversion model of engaging with restorative justice in myself and in the participants. In 
particular the limitations of merely adopting a practice without engaging with wider 
change (Sawatsky, 2009) became apparent in the school context. To better understand 
this gap, I examined the literature regarding rj and education and then turned to the theory 
and philosophy that proponents of rj connected to the judicial field had developed. From 
these, the various nuances in the principles and approaches taken by practitioners and 
theorists appeared and shed light on the perceptions and practices of teachers.  
What follows is a brief outline of these foundational perspectives as I explored 
them. This is not intended to be a review of the field as done so adequately by others 
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(Johnstone and Van Ness, 2007; Liebmann, 2007; McCold, 2008; Sawatsky, 2009; 
Sullivan & Tifft, 2005) but rather it is intended to reveal why educators find it 
challenging to decipher the different perspectives and find practical approaches for 
engaging with rj in a context that is not primarily about behaviour. By highlighting 
components of the various approaches, the need for a re-examination of the terms justice 
and restorative emerges.  
 B. Exploring the field 
 
 Like many educators globally, I was first introduced to rj through the significant 
work of O’Connell and Wachtel (Wachtel, 1997). Drawing on Maori traditions of justice 
they initially worked in the context of educating youth involved with crime in New South 
Wales, Australia and Pennsylvania, USA. This led to O’Connell and Wachtel recognizing 
the potential of rj for all students in all schools. To explain this concept, a social 
discipline window was developed as a theoretical framework that focused on the 
behaviour of students and how educators responded (Wachtel, 1999). A response that 
used high support and high expectations is considered restorative in that youth are 
nurtured by the consistent stable engagement of educators WITH students. This relational 
emphasis was in contrast to school environments where more authoritarian or permissive 
relationships existed between teachers and students that resulted in doing things TO or 
FOR students. According to Wachtel and O’Connell, in these contexts students are not 
consistently taught to take responsibility for their own actions. In early work, Wachtel 
(1999) coined the terms Real Justice and Safer Saner Schools to describe their work 
which brought together victims, offenders and their support communities, an approach 
that sought to move justice from being a retributive, adversarial response to wrongdoing 
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to a relational engagement that acknowledged and reinforced the interpersonal 
connections of community. More recently (2002) the term Real Justice has become a 
brand name for the approach of their training and graduate school the International 
Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP), which explicitly encourages the use of the term 
restorative practices. Under this umbrella term, restorative justice is considered a judicial 
restorative practice, restorative schools an educational restorative practice, family group 
counselling, a restorative practice related to social work, etc. (IIRP, n.d.).  
 To support their theoretical approach, Wachtel and O’Connell draw significantly 
on the work of Braithwaite (1989) another early proponent of rj who developed a theory 
of reintegrative shaming to describe why restorative justice is effective. Using 
Nathanson’s (1996) compass of shame, Braithwaite identified that peoples’ response to 
shame is the theoretical reason for the effectiveness of rj. Differentiating between 
reintegrative shaming and stigmatized shaming, Braithwaite highlights that when 
wrongdoing occurs, shame results in both those harmed and those who have caused harm. 
When this shame is used to stigmatize a person, they are alienated and cut off from 
community. When the shame is addressed and the community sends a message that they 
value the participants as people but not the harmful action, then shame is used to 
reintegrate people into their community. This theory has gained much attention and 
support through the frequent training sessions the IIRP conducts across the world, but 
criticisms of the theory exist as the emotion of shame carries with it significant negative 
connotations (Harris, 2006; Maxwell & Morris, 2004). In the context of education, this 
theory may contribute to the confusion educators experience in terms of understanding rj 
as distinguishing between reintegrative shaming and stigmatized shaming is difficult for 
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two key reasons. First there is a significant power differential between the adults and the 
students that in the busyness of a school day can easily be misused. In considering the 
role of shame in rj, this can lead to enacting stigmatized shaming if educators do not 
clearly understand the difference between the two types of shaming. Second, the 
language of stigmatized shaming resonates more readily with the language often 
emphasized in teacher education and professional development programs as well as 
government and school policies that encourage teachers to better manage their 
classrooms and student behaviour. Thus, the inconsistent and varied use of key terms 
teachers encounter in the rj resources available as well as the challenge it is to carry out 
educational policy with young people, readily contributes to growing ambiguity and 
understanding of rj. To address this, I found some clarity by turning to the work of those 
who were instrumental in re-introducing rj principles and practices in Western society 
prior to it entering educational institutions.  
 Howard Zehr (2005), an early pioneer in the field promoted rj as a paradigm shift, 
a different way of understanding justice, one that acknowledged the needs of the victim 
as the purpose of the judicial system and required that the offender be held accountable 
for harm done. The paradigm shift moved the focus from the inanimate laws and rules 
being broken, to the harm caused and suffered not just by those directly involved but also 
by stakeholders affected indirectly. Zehr’s work, grounded in a Judeo-Christian, 
Mennonite perspective, resonated with my own philosophy and provided a framework for   
comprehending the practical application Wachtel and O’Connell endorsed. 
 As a participant-observer in the research, this perspective was deepened with 
work that draws more significantly on indigenous cultural responses to brokenness in 
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community. Pranis, Stuart and Wedge (2003) as well as Rupert Ross (1996) have done 
much to highlight and recognize that key rj principles originate from ancient and current 
indigenous traditions that honour the significance of the interconnected nature of 
community. Within this interwoven cultural milieu, circle processes are employed to find 
ways for all members of the community to learn from each other’s wisdom in addressing 
conflict and harm done in the community. For me, this indigenous approach served to 
illuminate how harm done has roots in how the community is structured and interacts. As 
such it highlighted how rj is a way of being, a philosophy and not simply a response to 
harm done.  
 Integrating many of the perspectives put forward to date, more recently Jennifer 
Llewelyn (2009) has presented a comprehensive relational theory to explain why the 
judicial system would do well to engage more fully with rj. Her insights point to rj as a 
“restoration of balanced social relations and reparation of harms and is rooted in values of 
equality, mutual respect and concern” (nsrj-cura, 2007). 
 Interspersed throughout these theoretical proposals and discussions on rj is the 
dilemma put forward by justice advocate Ruth Morris (1998) that questions the use of the 
term restorative. Stating clearly that restorative allows for a reinforcement of the belief 
that crime begins with an individual and that it encourages a restoration to unjust social 
structures, she calls for transformative justice. Transformative justice she states, sees 
crime and harm as an opportunity for transformative healing for the whole community. 
She interprets rj as focusing on an incident of harm whereas transformative justice takes a 
broader view recognizing that harm didn’t begin with the act but arose out of a 
community context and cause. Her insights are echoed in the practice of those who seek 
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to reinforce the view that harm done must result in the transformation of social structures, 
not the restoration of structures and relationships that were the sites for producing the 
harm in the first place (Lockhardt & Zammit, 2005; Moore, 2004).  
 All of these perspectives combined reinforce the potential rj holds for school 
communities that are looking for improved interaction with students, but also create 
confusion for how to decipher the field and find a way forward for its effective 
integration into education. The fault lines Gavrielides (2008) lays out to clarify the 
debates in the field provide a structure. Though he chooses the judicial system to 
illustrate his observations as it was from here that the current engagement with rj arose, 
he indicates that the fault lines are alive and well in other jurisdictions, such as education 
as my study also discovered. He lays out six existing debates, five of which address rj 
beyond the judicial context: 
• Fault-line #1: Rj as a new paradigm or rj as a pragmatic, parallel approach. [The old 
adversarial, retributive paradigm must be abolished and replaced with the values and 
philosophy of the new paradigm OR rj can broaden the current institutional approach 
with alternatives and run parallel to it.]  
• Fault-line #2: Rj as a process or rj as an outcome. [A specific process is required to 
ensure a response is restorative OR rj is an achieved outcome that brings healing and 
restoration to the participants. The process for arriving at this healing is not 
important.] 
• Fault-line #3: Rj as mediation or rj as conferencing. [Participants in the rj conference 
are only those directly involved in the incident. Other stakeholders are not encouraged 
to participate for fear of vigilantism OR stakeholders must be present to support and 
encourage those directly involved but also to assure that their needs are met.]  
• Fault-line #4: Rj as coercive or rj as voluntary. [Participants are strongly encouraged 
to participate if they wish to avoid punishment OR participants are invited to 
participate and are discouraged from doing so under duress.] 
• Fault-line #5: Rj principles are flexible or rj principles are not flexible. [Must core 
principles be adhered to religiously OR can they be flexible?]  
 
These fault-lines could be identified in discussions I had with teachers and administrators 
who set out to embrace rj but found implementation very challenging. However, because 
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of the early implementation stages schools in Ontario are in, the fault lines are not as 
clearly entrenched between proponents of rj in education but rather can be found within 
the training approaches, within specific schools and within individual educators as they 
grappled with engaging with this new/old approach to peacemaking (Pranis, 2005). I also 
began to identify the fault-lines within myself. There is the perception that rj in education 
is a completely new approach—a paradigm shift that requires that all that led to zero-
tolerance practices be replaced; there is the pragmatic parallel approach that speaks of rj 
existing alongside the current codes of conduct schools had in place. There is the 
disagreement between the emphasis of rj being on the process and the emphasis being on 
the outcome. There is confusion about the importance of involving stakeholders beyond 
those directly involved in the harm done. There are proponents who feel it is alright to 
coerce people to participate and those who say rj is only effective when people participate 
voluntarily. Finally there are those who feel rj principles can be flexible and those that 
work to establish definite rj principles to govern rj in education.  
 What is important to note in all of the theoretical work presented here is that rj is 
considered first and foremost in the context of behaviour, specifically behaviour that 
causes harm (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007; Sawatsky, 2009; Zehr, 2005). Most 
proponents of rj recognize a deeper context that highlights community and relationship, 
but the harmful behaviour is the vehicle that spawns the discussion and exploration of 
alternative routes to healing. Entering into education as stated earlier, rj has been pulled 
into a broader context because the primary purpose of schools is not to manage behaviour 
but to educate people. Grappling with this difference and wishing to shift the focus from 
behaviour solely, it makes sense that educators such as Wachtel and the IIRP (n.d.), 
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Amstutz & Mullet (2005), and Thorsborne & Vinegrad (2002) propose dropping the term 
justice in an effort to focus on relationships. However in doing so, they and others with 
similar intentions fall into what Bianchi (1994) considers to be a fundamental mistake.  
They refrain from a discussion and explanation of the concept of justice. This failure leads to 
regrettable errors in thinking….Their lack of philosophical reflection on the concept of 
justice usually makes the results they achieve practically nil or even the very contrary of what 
they intended. (pp. 1-2) 
 
Bianchi’s prediction for ineffective and/or contrary results became evident in the research 
I conducted and thus challenged me to take seriously the need to explore the concept of 
justice. It is important however, to acknowledge that my argument is not the first of its 
kind. Bianchi and Zehr (2005) have made substantial contributions to examining the 
concept of justice. However, rarely are their contributions given significant attention in rj 
literature and rarely does it effectively guide implementation and practice. It is my 
intention to bring it to the foreground again by reflecting on the concept of justice using 
Bianchi and Zehr’s insights and adding the insights of Freire (2005), Buber, and 
Wolterstorff (2006, 2008). In this way, I aim to illustrate how a clearer, intentional 
understanding of the terms restorative and justice can help to clarify the ambiguity and 
inconsistency that exists across the field.  
II. Finding North 
 
 The theoretical argument for maintaining the term justice is presented in two 
parts. First I illustrate how eliminating the term results in further confusion about what is 
being restored and encourages practice for the sake of practice. Second, I demonstrate 
how a careful examination of the concept of justice leads to a broader understanding that 
 14  
has the potential for providing clarity that will aid in the development of purposeful, 
effective, sustainable practice.  
 
A. A compass without a needle: when the term ‘justice’ is eliminated 
 
 In the field of education it is common for schools engaged with restorative justice 
to eliminate the term justice in order to emphasize the approach they are taking to address 
some aspect of how they function as an educational institution. For some the focus is on 
how students are managed and disciplined, i.e. restorative discipline (Amstutz & Mullet, 
2005) or restorative consequences (IIRP, 2003; Petersen & Rau, n.d.); for others the 
focus shifts to the school environment, i.e. restorative school cultures (Cronin-Lampe & 
Cronin-Lampe, 2010); for others it broadens further to include the school community, i.e 
restorative communities (Wachtel, 2005; Morrison, 2007), for some it encompasses all of 
these, i.e. restorative approaches or practices (Hopkins, 2004; IIRP, n.d.; Doornai, 2009). 
In most cases, what is inferred or stated explicitly is that this engagement with rj 
recognizes, repairs and builds relationships. In spite of the fact that the term justice is 
eliminated in these contexts, professional and academic literature that is drawn upon as 
well as school policies and procedures continue to reference the judicial system as being 
the source of rj. A typical definition of restorative justice included in much of the 
literature is like the one found in Thorsborne & Vinegrad (2002) which includes these 
three principles of rj,  
1) Crime (and misconduct) is a fundamental violation of people and interpersonal 
relationships; 
2) Violations create obligations and liabilities; 
3) Rj seeks to heal and put right the wrongs.  
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From this starting point, proponents of rj in education indicate that rj is about moving 
schools from being rule-based to relationship-based school cultures (Amstutz & Mullet, 
2005; Hopkins, 2004; Morrison, 2007; Thorsborne & Vinegrad, 2002; Wachtel, 1999) so 
that it touches the experience of all students in a school not just those affected by harmful 
behaviour. [Characteristics of relational school cultures are presented later in the article.]  
 The theoretical expansions provided by these pioneers in the field of rj in schools 
have done much to deepen the entire field in terms of recognizing that harm done comes 
out of a community context. The growth of the IIRP which I introduced in Part I, is a 
clear example of this evolution as it promotes using the terms restorative practices to 
reflect this broader foundation.  
Restorative practices is the study of building social capital and achieving social discipline 
through participatory learning and decision-making…The most critical function of restorative 
practices is restoring and building relationships. (IIRP, n.d.) 
 
However, what occurs when the term justice is dropped and replaced by various other 
nouns in hopes of emphasizing relationship and community, is continued and perhaps 
deepened ambiguity. This is illustrated in discussions with administrators and teachers 
who after being trained, willingly embrace rj because they find it resonates with their 
approach to education. Yet, amongst those interviewed in the study (Vaandering, 2009) 
there was little consistency in terms of identifying and articulating what is being restored. 
Emphasis was on rj as a strategy for better managing student behaviour; few mention it in 
terms of it being philosophy because as one participant stated clearly: 
For it to be a philosophy you have to use it every single time without any other … but a tool 
is something you use, you have a little bag of tricks that you have to pull out and if the need 
arises for restorative practice it’s a really good one to use… I don’t consider it a philosophy 
because that would mean I use it all the time no matter what. (Vaandering, 2009, p. 245) 
  
Why in spite of significant training and eliminating the use of the term justice does this 
inconsistency and ambiguity continue? I suggest three reasons: 
 16  
 First, because schools have “traditionally adopted a quasi-judicial approach to the 
management of student misconduct, modelled on existing western criminal justice 
systems” (Thorsborne & Vinegrad, 2002, p. 9) school administrators are attracted to the 
effectiveness rj has had in the judicial context. Thus, many seeking to address issues of 
violence, bullying, and harassment after initial attempts using zero-tolerance policies had 
failed and alienated students, continue to associate rj with student behaviour and 
management strategies. Like in the judicial context, because past policies and codes of 
conduct are rooted in an entrenched adversarial approach to addressing behavioural 
issues, rj tends to be integrated into schools along side the previous adversarial code. 
When it appears the restorative approach doesn’t have the immediate desired outcome, 
the default position in the midst of a hectic school day becomes the more adversarial 
procedures with which most people are familiar. Thus dropping the term justice does not 
eliminate underlying connotations; simply changing the term doesn’t ensure that the 
underlying purpose for implementing rj is about relationships. A careful analysis of 
policy statements of schools and districts committed to rj indicate this clearly. Because 
schools historically have been hierarchical institutions, it is very difficult to change the 
retributive, adversarial language that has led to the problems in the first place 
(Vaandering, 2009). This is an echo of what Eisler (2000) states when she describes a 
domination model of schooling that is based on submission and coercion, a model that 
was and continues to be prevalent, and a model that we will “unwittingly reinforce” 
unless we understand how they were created (p. 9-13).   
 This traditional quasi-judicial, dominator model also puts educators in a difficult 
position as the lack of clarity and various terms attached to restorative encourages them 
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to waffle back and forth between understanding rj as a response to behaviour and a way 
of being. They feel the social expectation to be in control as a teacher, thereby prompting 
them to return to the ‘judicial’ understanding of rj. Yet inherently they know it is a strong 
relational partnership model (Eisler, 2000) that will provide an atmosphere where they 
can set clear expectations and provide adequate support for nurturing academic and social 
well-being of students.  
 Second, deepened ambiguity results when the word restorative is paired with 
terms such as ‘discipline’ or ‘school’ or ‘approach’. Changing the noun increases the 
confusion in regards to what is being restored as it opens up whole new arrays of 
possibilities. What is being restored? Is it a person, a relationship, a school, someone’s 
possessions or dignity? Is it the school’s sense of control, or ability to produce informed 
citizens? Without clearly defining what is being restored educators are quick to make 
assumptions about what it means and most often that tends to be something they want it 
to mean so that it reflects their personal approach and philosophy. This is the route of 
least resistance requiring little change on their part and leads to the frequent response that 
rj is “what we’ve always been doing anyway.” Educators tired of being required to 
engage with new initiatives, look for permission to avoid what rj has to offer if they sense 
it will require change on their part (Vaandering, 2009).  
 Finally, dropping the term justice contributes to ambiguity and the creation of 
fault-lines in the field because the focus shifts to more practical aspects of the word when 
attached to a different noun. For example, restorative discipline shifts attention to how-to 
discipline more effectively; restorative schools shifts attention to how-to be school; 
restorative approaches focuses on some aspect of how-to be students, educators or 
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schools. With the more ambiguous, conflicted term justice out of the way, training is 
permitted to race or gloss over philosophical and theoretical foundations in order to get to 
the how-to of education. This is what appeals to educators who are looking for quick, 
effective solutions to the challenges they face in the classroom. One trainer conscious of 
this desire for the practical and eager to convey the usefulness of rj, introduces his session 
stating, “This is a workshop about practice, not philosophy, not theory, but practice.” 
(Vaandering, 2009). As a result, schools engaged with rj run the risk of implementing rj 
practice simply for the sake of effective practice not for the sake of the building 
relationships and promoting healing.  
 Eliminating the term justice does not ensure or contribute to the hoped for 
development of a relational, partnership school culture, as doing so will not address the 
structure and policies governing the institution. For change to occur, the power 
relationships underlying past ineffective practices must be challenged (Eisler, 2000; 
Morrison, 2005) and harm must be recognized not as an individual behavioural incident 
but rather as a breach in relationship amongst people and/or the system of which they are 
a part (Jones, 2004; Lindstrom, 2007; Morrison, 2005). To accomplish this, I argue that 
engaging with a broader understanding of the concept of justice is necessary.  
 
B. A functioning compass: the term ‘ justice’ as a compass needle 
 
 In my efforts to bring a sense of clarity to the term restorative justice for 
educators, I found myself returning to the insights of proponents of transformational 
justice. Ruth Morris’ (1998) argument that harm is an opportunity for transformative 
healing for the whole community pointed to a broader understanding of justice that went 
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beyond the particular incident, beyond blame and restitution for a few individuals, to 
incorporate what I had come to know of rj addressing the collective vulnerability  that 
communities experience in their shared struggles and victories (Moore, 2004). Though I 
was tempted to advocate for changing the term restorative justice, I recognized that this 
would be an insurmountable task as it is embedded quite significantly in the field 
globally. Instead I considered what would occur if the term justice was examined and 
reclaimed. This led immediately to the question “what is justice?” and it was here in 
attempting to define the term that I came upon what I currently believe is the pivotal 
point of the whole dilemma—justice is much broader than the narrow adversarial 
focus it is given in the judicial context.  
 Significant to note at this point is the fact that the rj movement remains embedded 
in this judicial context and the narrow adversarial understanding of justice continues to be 
reinforced and reproduced in the rj movement primarily because the majority of the rj 
literature available repeatedly places the origins of our current practice of rj in the judicial 
field and because key proponents of the movement also speak primarily from their place 
in this same context. In spite of proponents’ best efforts to expand this perspective and 
advocate for a paradigm shift and culture change (Bianchi,1994; Morris, 1998; Sullivan 
and Tifft, 2005; Zehr, 2005) as long as it is understood as coming from the judicial 
context, it will be difficult to broaden. By coming at it from the context of education, I 
was able to consider justice apart from the justice system simply because I was very 
unfamiliar with how courts of law functioned. I inadvertently tried to find a way to make 
sense of it in a manner that matched my own experience and subsequently discovered it 
was possible to expand the notion of justice.  
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 Noddings (1999) and Wolterstorff (2008) whose work includes understanding 
justice in an educational context, directed my attention to a key principle of rj, namely 
that of repairing harm. Their perspectives on caring and teaching justly led me to 
consider “what is harm?” which then ultimately led to the deeper question--“What does it 
mean to be human?” Out of this place of questioning, justice in its primary sense emerged 
to bring new meaning and clarity for the potential of the term restorative justice.  
i. What does it mean to be human? 
 
 Though there are many definitions to draw on in terms of defining what it is to be 
human, Freire (2005) and Buber’s (1958) insights on this topic highlight key purposes of 
rj to date, namely repairing harm and building relationship (Morrison, 2007; Wachtel, 
1999; Zehr, 2005).  
 Paulo Freire (2005) primarily grapples with what it means to be human in his 
seminal work Pedagogy of the Oppressed in an effort to comprehend how to stop the 
harm done to peasants in an oppressive regime. Poignantly he points out that people have 
come to accept that they are ‘beings for others’ reduced to the level of object by an 
oppressive, powerful minority. He refutes this perspective that humans are adaptable, 
manageable beings and calls for transformed social structures that allow people to 
become ‘beings for themselves,” with an ontological vocation of becoming more fully 
human (pp. 73-75). Freire simplifies this by distinguishing between people living ‘to be’ 
and living ‘to be like’ (p. 48). People living to be like are forever seeking approval and 
direction limiting their potential to discover their uniqueness. They become imprisoned or 
are convinced that to be imprisoned in the control of another is acceptable and 
inescapable. People living to be grow to recognize themselves as human and thus begin 
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the journey of discovering more fully what it means to be human. They discover that 
freedom is the point at which they stretch to take on their capacity to be human. With this 
common vocation recognized and in place, incidents of harm and oppression are reduced 
as people allow the other to be more fully human as well. Freire commits his life to 
challenging people to recognize when they have been reduced to the level of an object or 
have become someone who dehumanizes others, treating them as objects and thereby 
ultimately turning themselves into an object. For Freire to be human means to be engaged 
in ‘being’ a subject that initiates living, not an object that exists to be acted upon or to act 
on other objects.  
 This understanding of what it means to be human is echoed in Buber’s (1958) 
influential writing I-Thou where he identifies that “all real living is meeting” (p. 25). 
Though Buber doesn’t focus on the results of objectification, he clearly identifies that 
being human occurs when people engage in relationships where they honour each other 
as human. He explains this in terms of the well-known I-Thou  
The primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion 
into the whole being can never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take place 
without me. I become through my relation to the Thou; and as I become the I, I say Thou. 
(pp. 24-25) 
If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a 
thing among things, and does not consist of things. ... (p. 16) 
  
 Buber (1958) crystallizes this relational understanding of what it is to be human 
when he states, "I think no human being can give more than this. Making life possible for 
the other, if only for a moment" (p. 261, Buber & Agassi, 1999). For Buber, this ability to 
look out for the well-being of another resides at the heart of what it is to be human. Not 
engaged in this care and respect for one another results in I-It experiences, experiences 
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identifies this as well when he states that a fundamental precondition for true 
humanization is dialogue which he defines as the encounter between people to name the 
world (p. 137). In other words one is human when they are in relationship with others 
who encourage them to be. This is a complex balance as relationship on its own can still 
result in systems of domination and objectification; and striving to be outside of 
relationship limits ones capacity to become more fully human. Johnstone and VanNess 
(2007) in outlining the conceptual tensions in the field and presenting options for going 
forward, touch on this balance when they suggest there is a need for respect amongst 
proponents of rj. “Respect means not only treating all parties as persons with dignity and 
worth, but also as people with wisdom and other valuable contributions to offer” (p. 19). 
Dignity and worth is made evident through an encouragement to make contributions. 
 Through this lens of what it is to be human, new insight can be gleaned in regards 
to foundational principles of rj. For example in the comparison that is made between 
adversarial justice and restorative justice (see Fig. 1) it becomes evident that the 
comparison is really a discussion based on what it means to be human. This is not 
regularly elaborated on in the field; what is highlighted however is a focus on harm. 
Harm considered in the context of what it is to be human takes on deeper meaning.  
 
ii. What is harm? 
 The question what is harm may seem simplistic and obvious. Yet because “victim 
needs and offender responsibility for repairing harm” (Zehr, 2002, p. 21,) has been the 
central focus of rj since it has come to the fore in the 1970’s, it warrants examination 
especially in the context of what it means to be human. In fact, by drawing attention to 
the role of harm, I propose that the founders of rj are attempting to make the distinction 
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between treating people as humans or objects. Key restorative justice principles are often 
juxtaposed with key principles of adversarial/criminal justice as the chart indicates.  
Two Different Views (Zehr, 2002) 
Criminal Justice Restorative Justice 
• Crime is a violation of the law and 
state. 
• Violations create guilt. 
• Justice requires the state to 
determine blame (guilt) and impose 
pain (punishment) 
• Crime is a violation of people and 
relationships. 
• Violations create obligations. 
• Justice involves victims, offenders, 
and community members in an 
effort to put things right.  
Figure 1. Two different views 
 Looking carefully at this juxtaposition, it becomes clear that rj advocates for 
maintaining the connection between those who have caused harm and those who have 
experienced the harm. It originated as a response to criminal justice that is understood as 
separating the crime from the people involved, a system that determines blame and 
imposes pain in hopes of deterring recidivism. Set within the discussion of what it is to be 
human, this perspective and practice of criminal justice turns the offender into an object 
to be acted on and by omission objectifies the victim by assuming they have no needs 
resulting from the harm done. By identifying the role of harm and the need to repair harm 
done, rj identifies that humans suffer harm and laws are objects that are broken. In 
essence, harm is done to humans not to objects. Freire (2005) makes this clear when he 
explains that when people are viewed as objects the cycle of dehumanization sets in as it 
is then possible to justify doing anything to them because objects exist to be acted upon 
and can be broken, but cannot be harmed.  
 Seen in this way, harm is injury inflicted on or against a person in any capacity 
they hold as a human being—physical, emotional, social. It is here that justice moves 
beyond the boundaries it has been given by the judicial system.  
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iii. What is justice?  
 
 Based on the responses to the questions “what is it to be human?” and “what is 
harm?” injustice occurs when people are turned into objects through relationship. The 
converse of this then identifies that justice occurs when people are honoured as human 
through relationship. Wolterstorff (2006) makes this clear when he differentiates between 
primary justice and justice as judgement: 
If meting out justice and rendering judgment become relevant when injustice has occurred or 
is said to have occurred, then there has to be another kind of justice and injustice than that of 
meting out justice and rendering judgment. There has to be a justice which has been violated 
or said to have been violated. There has to be a kind of justice which has broken down or is 
said to have broken down. Call that kind of justice, ‘primary justice’. Only when primary 
justice has broken down or is said to have broken down do rendering judgement and meting 
out justice enter the picture. (p. 25) 
 
Wolterstorff continues by arguing that this primary justice is present in social 
relationships when no one is wronged, when the worth of the other is placed in the 
forefront of our attention (pp. 31-32). This reflects what Freire promotes in identifying 
humans as subjects and what Buber identifies as the role of how we see ourselves in 
relation to other. In later work Wolterstorff (2008) names this distinction even more 
specifically as justice as inherent rights and justice as right order. The essence of this 
distinction can perhaps also be understood as social justice which examines the way 
people live and judicial justice which highlights what ought to be.  
 In the early days of rj, Dutch criminologist Herman Bianchi (1994) and American 
criminologist Howard Zehr (2005), both of whom are rooted in a Judeo-Christian 
worldview, worked hard to identify this distinction as the paradigm shift that was 
required for rj to be effectively implemented. In looking at their arguments in light of the 
above questions regarding what it is to be human and what harm is, their ideas may be 
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more in line with Wolterstorff’s (2006) definition of primary justice or justice-as-
inherent-rights. Bianchi, drawing on Jewish insight proposed justice as tsedeka where 
justice was not made manifest in the administration of law but rather in relationship as 
the following three characteristics indicate. Justice as tsedeka: (a) is substantiated when 
people’s actions show they have had the good of the other in mind; (b) upholds relational 
truth, where truth is found between people, within dialogue, and judged by its result; (c) 
occurs when people (both harmed and those causing harm) are set free from the 
consequences of conflict through reparation of harm. In essence, Bianchi’s theory states 
that justice is not just there, but must be “made effectual” (p. 26). 
 Zehr (2005), in a similar way highlights the relational aspect of rj where justice is 
based on the concept of shalom—God’s intention for how things are to be among people, 
between God and people, and even with nature (Yoder, as cited in Zehr, 2005, p. 132). 
When justice is recognized as concerning itself with need rather than merit, when it is 
understood as an act of liberation and of love which seeks to make right relationships, its 
concern is not with measuring if all individuals have equal basic liberties and rights, but 
rather with how to make things better for the poor and oppressed (pp. 136-157). 
Specifically Zehr indicates that questions of crime and harm done to others cannot be 
separated from questions of poverty and power (2005, p.153). 
 This discussion about justice must also acknowledge contemporary philosopher 
John Rawls’ (2001) seminal work Justice as Fairness. This work has had a significant 
impact on Western society today as his theory encourages a two-pronged understanding 
of justice—distributive and retributive. In an effort to access the notion of justice, Rawls 
idealizes that in a perfect democratic society “justice as fairness” would be the most 
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appropriate system for social cooperation. Here, each person would have two basic rights: 
(a) the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties (i.e., 
the distributive principle); and (b) social and economic inequality, only when it exists if 
one is attached to an office open to all or if the inequality is seen to be to the greatest 
benefit to the least advantaged (i.e., the difference principle). Though these two prongs 
may well seem to align with Wolterstorff’s (2008) perceptions of justice and include a 
deep respect and honour for people, (Rawls is often seen as being the originator of social 
justice [Pogge, 2007]), Rawls principles essentially provide the basis for justice as 
deserts wherein what people are entitled to depends on what they do or do not do (p. 72). 
Though Rawls’ intention may be a society where all are honoured equally, his emphasis 
on fairness encourages people to examine how they are like others which then according 
to what Freire and Buber indicate, leads to objectification. Zehr (2005) identifies this as 
an overemphasis on individual rights that measures if all individuals have equal basic 
liberties and rights and precludes our responsibility to honour each other as worthy 
human beings.  
 Justice as shalom, justice as tsedeka, primary justice, social justice, justice as 
inherent rights all speak of justice where humans are respected as subjects that are 
nurtured and set free through respectful relationship. Justice honours the worth of the 
other, where honour is a praxis that encapsulates both the active relationship and respect 
for the other. This understanding of justice is what I propose has been usurped by an 
overemphasis on justice as fairness and individual rights that the judicial system is intent 
on implementing. It is the difference between doing justice and due justice. Thus what is 
needed in the field of restorative justice is a concerted effort to remind all people that 
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• justice is a call to recognize that all humans are worthy and to be honoured simply 
because they are human;  
• injustice occurs when people are objectified;  
• and the term restorative becomes meaningful as it specifically refers to restoring 
people to a state of being honoured as human.  
  
Understood in this manner, it is crucial that the terms restorative and justice be 
maintained and paired to provide the much needed reference point that has been lacking. 
The field has been functioning in many instances like a compass without a needle. Justice 
understood in its primary sense serves as the consistent reference point (North), always 
reminding us what it is to be human. The term restorative justice serves as the compass 
needle that allows us all to keep our bearings as rj moves into different fields and 
directions. 
III. Aligning the compass with a destination 
 
 How does having this reference point clarify the theory and practice of rj? I begin 
with theory. 
 Johnstone and Van Ness (2007) in their chapter The meaning of restorative justice 
have distilled the tensions in the field to an identification and description of three general 
conceptions of restorative justice—the encounter conception, the reparative conception, 
and the transformative conception. The encounter conception involves stakeholders 
meeting to decide what needs to be done as a result of the action. The reparative 
conception seeks to heal and repair harm that is done rather than impose equal harm on 
an offender. The transformative conception looks for transformation of social structures 
and interactions that have allowed for harm to occur. To further describe the reasons for 
the tensions they use a metaphor of a three-storey house that has been built on a hillside 
that allows for entry into any one of the three floors from the outside. The first storey of 
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the house is the transformative conception that allows for the broadest application of the 
three; the second and third stories represent either the reparative or the encounter 
approach. They are smaller and offset from each other with porches etc. as they share 
similar principles but not all. The metaphor provides a clear image of what is occurring in 
the field. Through it Johnstone and Van Ness make the case that there is much overlap 
amongst each conception as they encounter, repair and transform. The differences, they 
say, lie in where each places the emphasis and are a result of the deeply contested nature 
of the concept of restorative justice. Rather than work to resolve those differences, they 
suggest the field would do well to accept the differences for the wisdom and valuable 
contributions each can make (p. 16-20). 
 Though there is merit in this, my argument for a broader understanding of justice, 
I believe can go a long way towards resolving the tensions that exist. We need not simply 
‘accept’ difference. What is missing in Johnstone and Van Ness’ (2007) analogy is the 
foundation of the three-storey house. If a common, broader understanding of justice is 
embraced by all proponents in the field, it will serve as the foundation out of which all 
the different conceptions operate. A reparative conception of rj will be strengthened if 
people have as their goal not just to repair harm done but also to restore people to being 
humans and not objects. An encounter conception will be strengthened if the encounters 
are set up with the goal of guiding participants to honouring each other as human. A 
transformative encounter is strengthened as clarity and guidance is provided for the 
systemic changes. The reason for the transformation is clear as it would be able to 
provide the freedom for becoming more fully human. Without the foundation being 
firmly in place, the house is at risk of toppling especially since new stories are being 
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added and positioned haphazardly above the first. The proverbial house on the sand needs 
to become the house on the rock.  
 A similar theoretical case can be made in education circles where Blood and 
Morrison (2007) have made sense of the discrepancies in education circles by creating a 
triangle to represent an integrated whole school model of restorative justice. This model 
currently has as its foundation preventative, proactive approaches with the goal of 
reaffirming relationships. These approaches are used to engage the whole school 
population in relational practices such as social skills programs, curricula, and school 
policies. Built on this foundation are approaches such as corridor conferencing, peer 
mediation, and problem solving circles for the purpose of managing difficulties and 
disruption arising with some students with the goal of repairing relationships. The peak 
of the triangle represents full restorative justice conference approaches taken with 1-5% 
of the population that require intensive attention for the rebuilding of relationships.  
 Looking through the lens of justice as honouring the worth of the other, this 
whole school model of restorative justice also has no foundation to draw upon. Though 
there is consistency evident throughout each of the levels in regards to an emphasis on 
relationship, there is nothing in place that will prevent the approaches from encouraging 
participants to remain or slip further into objectification of each other. This is evident in 
the fact that each of the three levels of the triangle exists primarily to target inappropriate, 
disruptive behaviour. It could be argued that the primary level is proactive and thus 
focused not on behaviour but relationship. However, in describing this primary level, 
Morrison (2007) indicates, “the aim is to develop and affirm students’ social and 
emotional competencies and skills, particularly in the area of conflict resolution, so that 
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students are able to resolve differences in respectful and caring ways” (p. 107, emphasis 
added). Looking back at the discussion of what it means to be human, this theoretical 
approach teeters as a result of placing significant emphasis on relationship while 
forgetting about the reason for striving for positive relationship. .  
 What my argument contributes to Blood and Morrison’s (2007) model is a 
foundation out of which each of the three they suggest can grow. The goal of this level 
however is different than that of changing or managing student behaviour. Its emphasis 
would be identified as our common human vocation of ‘becoming more fully human’ 
(Freire, 2005) through relationship. This foundation provides a definite purpose for the 
encounters we have with each other in schools and reinforces the calling of schools to be 
institutions of learning rather than institutions that exist to control behaviour.  
 Looking back now to the fault-lines that Gavrielides (2008) suggests, defining 
justice as honouring the worth of the other through relationship provides a means for 
assessing the purpose of each of the differences. Here the practical contribution of having 
a common reference point becomes evident. For example, in regards to faultline #1 the 
question can be asked, does rj as a new paradigm honour the worth of the other and 
support a common vocation of becoming more fully human through relationship? If yes, 
than it can be accepted as a rj principle. Does rj as a pragmatic parallel approach honour 
the worth of the other? Again if yes, then it continues as it is. But if it becomes evident in 
a school either approach does not honour students, then students are at risk of being 
turned into objects, and continuing in this manner will undermine the potential of rj as 
cooptation will occur. This is a very serious concern as rj will then be used to harm and 
manipulate the people involved under the guise of being committed to repairing harm. 
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Each of Gavrielides fault-lines could be assessed in a similar manner to gauge and inform 
the various principles that are being adhered to in the field. Fault-line #2: Does the rj 
process employed provide people with a greater sense of their humanity? Does the 
outcome of the rj practice acknowledge that all involved are human? Fault-line #3: Does 
the mediation allow for participants to participate in such a way that the humanity of all 
stakeholders is enhanced? Does the rj conference that includes all stakeholders provide a 
process that guides participation that honours each participant? Fault-line #4: Is it 
possible to coerce people to participate and still treat them as worthy? Does invitational 
participation prevent objectifying people? Fault-line #5: Do each of the rj principles 
adhered to honour or measure participants? By excluding or adding some principles, does 
the rj practice begin to measure people? 
 To further illustrate the practical contribution that understanding justice as 
honouring the worth of all through relationship provides, I present an initial simple 
application I have experienced personally and observed in educational institutions that 
could be applied in every context where rj is engaged. By asking myself the following 
three simple reflective questions, like a compass needle, I am consistently pulled back to 
the foundational elements of restorative justice described in Part II. Am I measuring? Am 
I honouring? What message am I sending? Asking am I measuring? is another way of 
asking if I am judging and objectifying someone for selfish, domineering purposes. 
Asking am I honouring? is a way of checking to see if I am doing all I can to let someone 
become more fully human, to let someone be who they are, to encourage them in 
contributing what they can. Asking what message am I sending? provides a way of 
double checking from the other’s perspective what I am doing. Are they thinking they are 
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being measured and judged or are they thinking I honour them as a human being? 
(Vaandering, 2009). 
 Committed to rj as a way of being, these three questions guide how I interact with 
others personally and professionally. Committed to the implementation of rj in 
educational institutions, these three questions can serve to guide and assess whether 
teaching practice, administrative practice, policies and programs, as well as student and 
community interaction are rooted in an understanding of justice that honours every 
person. Committed to rj in any profession, these questions become a guide that 
acknowledges there is a specific foundation out of which rj practice grows.  
 To illustrate this, I share examples in my personal experience as well as an 
example of an institutional experience. In my own life the questioning took the form of 
an internal dialogue that occurred before, during and after my interactions with people: 
Am I honouring this person, doing what I can to give them the freedom to be who they 
are? Or am I measuring this person, judging them to see if and how they fit into what I 
might consider acceptable, measuring them to see if I can manipulate them for my 
benefit? What message did I send that person or that group of people? Did they leave 
feeling measured and judged or honoured and respected? That person who is angry with 
me, did I convey to her that I did not think she measured up to my expectations? That 
person who told me he appreciated how I listened to him, how did I convey to him that he 
was worthy? And so on. What I discovered through these conversations with myself 
when I was brutally honest was that I was much more inclined to measure people and 
judge people in spite of my commitment to do otherwise. In grappling with this, the 
reality of living in a society that is bent on measurement, evaluation, economic pursuit, 
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and competition emerged and a commitment to honouring people for their humanity was 
counter-cultural. At every turn, I found myself staring in the face of a way of being that 
objectified who I was and who my fellow human beings were. Committing to rj was and 
continues to be exhausting (Vaandering, 2009).  
 Applying these questions in an institutional context had similar results. Educators 
introduced to justice as honouring the worth of all, implemented rj into their practice and 
discovered the far reaching effects of looking at people through this different lens. What 
began as a strategy that they anticipated would respect students who had been harmed 
and caused harm, turned into a reflective practice that challenged educators to examine 
how the institutional structure itself, all its policies and practices, the curriculum and 
pedagogy, sent messages that honoured or measured school participants. Educators, 
myself included, became painfully aware that how we spoke to our students was often 
from a place of dominance where we were commanding students rather than dialoguing 
with them; it became evident that the math problemsolving questions encouraged selfish 
measuring and judging with their attempts at motivating students to buy and sell, enlarge 
their property and count their possessions; assessment and evaluation strategies became 
glaring examples of objectifying students where after spending weeks encouraging and 
supporting them in their efforts to learn, a test or report card mark proclaimed loudly that 
they did or did not measure up. Again wherever we turned we realized that choosing to 
honour people was countercultural and that the educational institution was in most cases 
not designed to honour the people it served. Implementing rj required commitment and 
that commitment as teachers and administrators express is exhausting (Vaandering, 
2009).  
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 In spite of the effort required to honour people as worthy, along with exhaustion, 
comes a perspective on living that resonates with who we are as human beings. It is this 
perspective that Zehr (2005) speaks of as a paradigm shift, and that Freire (2005) 
identifies as a cultural revolution. That revolution takes place in and through the lives of 
individuals and communities who live the reality that rj is a way of being, a life style, a 
worldview, a philosophy. If we can honour people regardless of what they do or say, 
regardless of whether they have committed a crime, broken a school rule, or hurt another 
human being, we consider what we can do that would allow them to be more fully 
human, to be free. If we honour people it opens the door to recognizing them as part of a 
broader community that has an impact on others. We recognize more fully what we 
would feel like if we were in their shoes. Honouring people sends us seeking ways to 
maintain and build connections; measuring people allows us to think of people as 
disposable objects and we have no problem cutting our connections with them.  
 Though there have been many attempts at defining rj that have accumulated to a 
point where there seems to be a tradition that says rj resists a complete definition 
(Wheeldon, 2009), in light of the details in this paper, I believe the following contribution 
may be significant. I submit it in hopes that perhaps it will contribute a sense of stability 
and consistency in the field while at the same time be flexible enough to allow the 
various jurisdictions freedom to develop effective processes and outcomes.  
Rj acknowledges justice as honouring the inherent worth of all and is enacted 
through relationship. As such it affects all social structures. When something 
occurs that undermines the well-being of some, rj provides a space for dialogue 
so that the humanity of all involved and affected can be restored and each person 
can once again become a fully contributing member of the community of which 
they are a part. 
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As different proponents and fields engaging with rj grow and encounter roadblocks, 
keeping in mind the essence of what it means to be human and challenging ourselves to 
reflect critically on our own actions, there is greater potential for rj guiding significant 
social structural change in a wide variety of contexts.  
IV. Conclusion: Travelling together in one direction  
 
 Coming to the end of this article, which describes the experience of an education 
researcher working to make sense of how to incorporate rj into schools, as the reader you 
have opportunity to reflect on the argument presented in the context of your own 
involvement with rj. The article sets out clearly that if justice is understood as honouring 
the worth of the other through relationship, the term restorative justice is significant, and 
meaningfully describes its process, outcome and foundational philosophy. If understood 
as such it narrows the gap created by rj practice continuing to march ahead of theory and 
suggests a concrete solution that contributes to clearing up the ambiguity and 
inconsistency that currently plagues the field and holds it back from being more widely 
and deeply effective. 
 As a final illustration of this and as a challenge for all proponents of rj I reiterate 
the insights of Dyck (2006) who states in Reaching toward a structurally responsive 
training and practice of restorative justice:  
It is puzzling to see how many proponents of restorative justice can limit their focus to only 
the correctional aspects of restorative justice … and refuse to take into account the 
“transformative,” economic, and structural dimensions of justice, that is, the social structural 
conditions that constrain the lives of us all and affect the extent to which any one of us can 
live restorative lives. (p. 537) 
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 Because my own personal and professional engagement with rj resulted in seeing 
rj as encompassing all social structural conditions, the awareness of this limited 
perspective of rj that Dyck finds puzzling, I surmise, has come about because of his own 
lived experience with rj. Unless one has experienced in some way the ah-ha moment that 
occurs in a restorative justice dialogue it is difficult to recognize how rj is about social, 
structural conditions. In an attempt to identify how this awareness arises consider what 
happens in a rj circle experience. A rj circle has been organized to repair harm where 
people who have been harmed, people who have caused harm, and their supporters are 
provided a space in which the stories of each can be heard. The crucial moment occurs 
when a facilitator wisely encourages each person, including the one who has caused 
harm, to express their needs in order for healing to occur. Though difficult to articulate, 
what occurs in this moment in time is the opportunity for a sense of collective 
vulnerability to arise (Moore, 2004), a sense of ‘there but for the grace of God go I’. And 
it is in this space that the group gathered can look beyond the incident to the context of 
the incident which will include each of them personally as well as the social structural 
conditions in which they find themselves in. As suggestions for repairing harm come 
forward through the awareness of the needs expressed, they can then include 
recommendations for change in the structures in which participants find themselves.  
 To recognize that rj encompasses social, structural conditions requires that 
proponents engage with rj not solely from the outside as a solution for others who have 
been affected by harm but from the inside as a way of being for themselves. This 
distinction was evident with educators, many of whom when interviewed indicated they 
would encourage students to participate in circles, but would not participate themselves 
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stating they weren’t the kind of person to share their feelings (Vaandering, 2009). Freire 
(2005) uncovers what is going on here in his discussion of oppressors and oppressed. He 
explains that unless one becomes conscious of being objectified, unless one becomes 
conscious of their capacity to objectify others, in other words unless one becomes 
conscious of dehumanization, humanization cannot be nurtured.  
From this premise, I have argued that defining justice in its primary sense as 
honouring the worth of the other and challenging ourselves with questions such as am I 
honouring, am I measuring, what message am I sending, people become personally and 
collectively conscious of their capacity to allow themselves to be objectified and to 
objectify others. One cannot arrive at this point instantly. It is a complex journey and one 
that requires a faithful compass with a needle that keeps us headed in a definite direction.  
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